Abstract-In recent years, various benchmark suites have been developed to evaluate the efficacy of Android security analysis tools. Tool developers often choose such suites based on the availability and popularity of suites and not on their characteristics and relevance due to the lack of information about them.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Motivation
Effectiveness of Android security analysis tools is evaluated with benchmarks and real-world apps. The effectiveness of static taint analysis tools like AmanDroid [1] , FlowDroid [2] , HornDroid [3] , and IccTA [4] has been evaluated by applying them to benchmarks from DroidBench, ICCBench, and UBCBench [5] benchmark suites and comparing tool verdicts with benchmark labels that indicate the presence/absence of specific vulnerability or malicious behavior.
Such tool evaluations have used benchmarks without evaluating the authenticity and the representativeness of the benchmarks. Authenticity is the truthfulness of the claim about the presence/absence of a vulnerability or malicious behavior in a benchmark (Section 2.2.2 in [6] ). Representativeness is the similarity between the manifestation/occurrence of a vulnerability in a benchmark and in real-world apps (Section 3 in [7] ). Consequently, the usefulness of findings from these evaluations is diminished in terms of the ability of tools and techniques to detect vulnerabilities or malicious behaviors (due to authenticity) and the general applicability of tools and techniques (due to representativeness).
Recently, there have been two efforts focused on the authenticity of benchmarks. Mitra and Ranganath [6] created Ghera, a suite of demonstrably authentic Android app vulnerability benchmarks, to address the issue of authenticity. They also established the representativeness of Ghera benchmarks (in terms of API usage) [7] . Pauck et al. [8] developed ReproDroid, a tool to help verify the authenticity of Android app vulnerability benchmarks. They found that not all claims about the presence/absence of vulnerabilities in benchmarks in DIALDroid, DroidBench, and ICCBench benchmark suites were true.
It is common in other communities to study and characterize benchmarks. In the program analysis community, Blackburn et al. [9] developed and used metrics based on static and dynamic properties of programs to characterize and compare the DaCapo benchmarks with SPEC Java benchmarks [10] . Isen et al. [11] measured several properties of embedded Java benchmarks and how well they represent real-world mobile apps. In the systems community, Pallister et al. [12] characterized benchmarks based on the energy consumption properties of embedded platforms. In the database community, such assessments have been around since 1990s [13] . However, such close scrutiny of benchmark suites have not occurred in the Android security community.
Motivated by the aforementioned efforts to analyze and characterize benchmarks, we undertook an effort to assess the representativeness of multiple Android app vulnerability benchmark suites.i.e., how well does a benchmark suite represent real-world apps?
B. Research Questions
The objective of our effort is to answer the following research questions: 
C. Contributions
In this paper, we make the following contributions: 1) Provide empirical evidence about the representativeness of four Android app vulnerability benchmark suites. 2) Identify gaps between the evaluated benchmark suites and real-world apps in terms of APIs that are used in real-world apps but not in the benchmark suites.
II. CONCEPTS AND SUBJECTS
A. API usage as a measure of representativeness
Representative vulnerability benchmarks should have two aspects. First, they should capture vulnerabilities that occur in the real world. Second, the manifestation of vulnerabilities in representative benchmarks should be similar (if not identical) to that in real-world apps. Ranganath and Mitra [7] observed this challenge while establishing the representativeness of Ghera benchmarks. So, they introduced the notion of using API usage as a weak but general measure of representativeness of benchmarks. They reasoned "the likelihood of a vulnerability occurring in realworld apps is directly proportional to the number of real-world apps using the Android APIs involved in the vulnerability". Consequently, to measure the representativeness of benchmarks, they measured how often APIs used in benchmarks were used in real-world apps.
In this evaluation, we use the above notion and a similar approach to measure the representativeness of benchmarks.
B. Evaluated Benchmark Suites/Repositories
• DroidBench [8] 
C. Real-World Apps
We collected 700K apps from AndroZoo [14] in March 2019. From this set of 700K apps, we curated a set of 473K apps that target API levels 19 thru 27. An API level uniquely identifies the framework API revision offered by a version of the Android platform. In an Android app, the minimum API level is the least framework API version required by the app and target API level is the framework API version targeted by the app. For this evaluation, we initially picked target API level 19 thru 27 because most benchmarks targeted these API levels. However, we later discovered that Android currently does not support API levels 19 thru 22. Therefore, to make the evaluation current, from the set of 473K apps, we retained only apps that target API levels 23 thru 27. Hence, we ended up with a sample of 226K real-world Android apps. TABLE I provides the distribution of this sample across considered target API Levels.
III. EXPERIMENT
A. Preparing the benchmarks
By design, each Android app is bundled as a self-contained APK file that contains all code and resources necessary to execute the app but are not provided by the underlying Android framework. However, due to the build process of Android apps, the APKs may contain unnecessary code and resources (e.g. unused methods). So, ProGuard [15] tool can be used as part of the Android app build process to remove unnecessary artifacts from APKs.
Every benchmark suite considered in this evaluation provides pre-built APKs and source files for each of its benchmarks. The pre-built APKs provided by DroidBench, ICCBench, and UBCBench contain unnecessary code and resources. Also, the benchmarks do not have the same minimum and target API levels. Specifically, DroidBench benchmarks have minimum API level 8 and target API level 14 thru 24, Ghera benchmarks have minimum API level 22 and target API level 27, ICCBench benchmarks have minimum and target API level 25, and UBCBench benchmarks have minimum and target API level 19.
Since we wanted to measure the representativeness of benchmark suites and compare them based on API usage, we needed to control for the effects of unnecessary APIs and API level on the findings of the evaluation. Therefore, we rebuilt every benchmark from its source with minimum API level set to 23, target API level set to 27, using appcompat support library version 27.1.1, and using Proguard to remove unnecessary APIs. We chose API levels 23 thru 27 because they are currently supported by Android.
We ensured the rebuilt benchmarks were indeed supported by API levels 23 thru 27 by executing each benchmark on an emulator running Android 23 and 27. As part of the execution, we manually interacted with the app until no further interaction was possible. Often, this meant interacting with various widgets on a screen and navigating to various screens in an app. If the benchmark or app crashed, then we recorded the crash. TABLE II lists the total number of benchmarks in each suite, the number of benchmarks that we were able to successfully build, and the number of benchmarks that crashed during execution. In this evaluation, we considered all benchmarks that could be built successfully including the ones that crashed. We considered the crashed benchmarks because we were unsure if they crashed due to a vulnerability intentionally captured in the benchmark or other reasons such as change of API levels.
Observations: From TABLE II, we see that, most benchmarks not only build but also execute on the currently supported versions of Android (even when they were not designed to run on those versions) -out of 311 benchmarks across all benchmark suites, only 35 crashed during execution and only 10 could not be built successfully. So, while most benchmarks were not explicitly designed to run on recent versions of Android, they are well supported by recent versions of Android. 
B. API-based App Profiling
We use an adaptation of the method used by Ranganath and Mitra [7] to determine the APIs used by the sample of real-world Android apps and by the benchmarks.
In this method, for each app, the elements and attributes in its manifest along with all callback methods and all methods that were used but not defined in the app are considered while ignoring obfuscated methods, i.e., methods with single character names. Further, to make apps comparable, for overridden methods and fields, class hierarchy analysis is used to consider the overridden methods and fields as opposed to the overriding methods and fields. Of these APIs, only APIs whose fully qualified name (FQN) contained the prefix android, com.android, java, or org are considered because the method focuses on measuring representativeness in terms of Android APIs.
Numerous APIs are commonly used by almost all Android apps (e.g. UI related APIs). We ignored such APIs, based on a baseline app 1 , to eliminate their effect on the experiment. Columns 2 and 3 in TABLE III show the total number of APIs used in a benchmark suite and the number of APIs that we considered.
C. Using Android app developer discussions in Stack Overflow to identify relevant and security-related APIs
Ranganath and Mitra [6] considered the set of filtered APIs (see TABLE III) as relevant to Android app development. DroidBench  2188  798  769  744  Ghera  1906  518  504  494  ICCBench  185  70  70  70  UBCBench  751  99  98  96 From this set, they manually identified a subset of (securityrelated) APIs as related to Android security. Since the experimenter's subjectivity and bias could influence the findings of the evaluation via this manual identification, we decided to use Stack Overflow data to identify security-related APIs. Further, we also decided to use Stack Overflow data to prune the set of filtered APIs into the set of relevant APIs. We curated the set of security-related tags from Security Stack Exchange [16] due to the lack of information about security-related tags on Stack Overflow. We added the security tag to this set. From the Stack Overflow posts that had Android tag, we identified posts with at least one security-related tag. Thus, we ended up with a set of 460K posts related to Android security. c) Filtered posts based on API levels: Since API level 23 was released in 2015, we considered only posts that had some activity -created, were answered, edited, commented on, voted on, or marked as favorite or accepted -on or after 2015. An API that did not garner interest after 2015 is likely deprecated in API levels 23 thru 27 or well understood by developers. In either case, we deemed such APIs as irrelevant to our evaluation. After this filtering, we ended up with 831K Android related posts and 318K Android security related posts.
d) Identified relevant and security-related APIs:
If the class name and the method/field name of an API co-occurred in a post, then we considered the post as discussing the API. Based on this notion, if a filtered API was discussed in an Android related post, then the API was deemed as relevant. Similarly, if a filtered API was discussed in an Android security related post, then we deemed it as security-related.
D. Measuring Representativeness with API Usage Percentage
For each benchmark suite, for each corresponding relevant API, we calculated the percentage of real-world apps that used the API. We did the same for each security-related API.
E. Examining Gap between Real-World Apps and Benchmarks
Of the 2118K APIs used by the apps in our real-world app sample, we ignored the APIs used in all benchmarks in DroidBench, Ghera, ICCBench, and UBCBench. Of the remaining 2115K APIs, we ignored APIs related to UI and third party libraries as such APIs are not the focus of the benchmarks being evaluated. The remaining 26K APIs were spread across 31 unique package-prefixes 2 . From this set, we identified security-related APIs using Stack Overflow posts with at least one security-related tag (as described in Section III-C). Based on the frequency of Stack Overflow posts discussing an API, we selected the top 10 APIs across 27 package-prefixes and manually examined them to see if they could lead to a vulnerability and, consequently, to the creation of a new benchmark. We ignored 4 package-prefixes -android/print, android/printservices, android/inputmethodservice, and android/Manifest retrospectively since we realized that they contain APIs pertaining to features (e.g., UI and printing services) that are not the focus of the considered benchmark suites.
IV. ANSWERING RQ1 -MEASURING COVERAGE For each benchmark suite, the corresponding graph in Fig. 1 shows the percentage of real-world apps using a relevant API that is used by the suite along with the percentage of Stack Overflow posts discussing the same API.
A. Relavant APIs
We found that, for all four benchmark suites, all relevant APIs are being used by all real-world apps in our sample. Additionally, for DroidBench, Ghera, ICCBench, and UBCBench
(73%), 340 (67%), 55 (78%), and 79 (81%) relevant APIs are being used by more than 60% of real-world apps, respectively. Hence, in terms of API usage, real-world apps are well-represented by all four benchmark suites.
Comparatively, DroidBench (769) and Ghera (504) use more than five times the number of relevant APIs used by UBCBench (98) and ICCBench (70). In terms of the percentage of relevant APIs used by more than 60% of the real-world apps, DroidBench (562) and Ghera (340) use more than four times the number of relevant APIs used by UBCBench (79) and ICCBench (55).
So, in terms of coverage of APIs used by real-world apps, DroidBench and Ghera fare better than UBCBench and ICCBench.
Further, in Fig. 1 , most of the prominent spikes in the line corresponding to the number of Android related Stack Overflow posts are associated with relevant APIs that are used by more than 60% of the real-world apps (the spikes lie to the left of the vertical dashed line). This suggests the benchmarks are not only representative but also use APIs that are often discussed by Android developers.
B. Security-related APIs
The number of APIs deemed as security-related is similar to the number of APIs deemed as relevant by Stack Overflow (see columns 4 and 5 in TABLE III). Hence, even in terms of security-related API usage, all four benchmark suites are representative.
While 117 of APIs were deemed as as security-related in an earlier evaluation of the representativeness of Ghera [7] , we deemed 494 of APIs as security-related in this evaluation. The staggering difference between the number of security-related APIs can be attributed to how APIs were deemed as securityrelated: manually based on expert knowledge vs automatically based on community knowledge.
V. ANSWERING RQ2 -IDENTIFY GAPS
As explained in Section III-E, we identified that 26K APIs were used by apps in our real-world app sample but not used by any benchmark. Of the 26K APIs, 8K APIs were deemed as security-related since they were discussed at least once in Android security-related Stack Overflow posts. Approximately 2K APIs (25%) were discussed by at least 52 posts. Moreover, approximately 300 APIs were discussed in more than 1000 posts. Interestingly, 18K of the 26K APIs were not discussed in any Android security related posts.
When we consider the package-prefixes of the 8K APIs deemed as security-related, there were 31 unique packageprefixes. From the perspective of package-prefixes, the benchmarks use APIs with only 19 of these package-prefixes. Since 60% (19/31) of the package-prefixes are known, the benchmarks are doing a good job of covering unique packageprefixes, i.e., posses breadth. However, the benchmarks are not using approximately 7K security-related APIs in known package-prefixes, i.e., lack of depth.
A. Suggestions to extend the benchmark suites
We wanted to know how many of the 8K APIs could be used to create new benchmarks. Consequently, we categorized the APIs based on their package-prefix to create 27 sets. Finally, we selected the top 10 APIs from each of the 27 sets based on the number of posts discussing an API to create a set of 270 APIs. We manually examined these APIs by studying the Android documentation, CVE reports and source code for those APIs. We discovered that 17 (6%) of these APIs can be used to create new benchmarks. These APIs are related to Android app features such as ICC, loading web content, communicating via Bluetooth, interacting with a database, crypto, account management, and low-level file management.
Following are two examples of these 17 APIs can lead to vulnerabilities and can be used to create new benchmarks.
• We discovered android.webkit. WebView.loadUrl(url, headers) is a variant of loadUrl(url) with an additional input parameter. Given the functional similarities of these methods, loadUrl(url, headers) can lead to similar vulnerabilities that were shown to arise from the use of loadUrl(url) in prior efforts [6] . --% Real-World apps using a relevant API --% Android related Stack Overflow Posts discussing a relevant API unexamined APIs could lead to vulnerabilities and be used to create new benchmarks.
B. Caveat
Out of curiosity, we explored the 18K APIs that did not appear in Android security related posts in Stack Overflow. Out of the 18K APIs, 4K were methods and the rest were fields. We examined a sample of these 4K methods.
We discovered that the method, KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder.setAttestationChallenge(bytes), belonging to the package android.security.keystore is related to security. This method takes a collection of bytes as input and uses it to create an attestation challenge for a public key. An entity receiving the public key with the attestation challenge can use the challenge to verify if the public key was created in response to a specific request. However, if bytes, needed to create the attestation challenge, is null, then the public key created will be signed with a self-signed certificate or a dummy signature. A Public key signed with a self-signed certificate or a dummy certificate is known to be insecure since such a certificate cannot be authenticated.
This API is being used by 17 apps in our real-world app sample. These 17 apps are related to finance and have a cumulative download of at least 100 million. Clearly, this method/API is critical. Hence, we plan to create a benchmark involving this method and contribute it to Ghera.
The presence of a security-related API in the set of 18K APIs suggests that Stack Overflow posts cannot serve as the ground truth to identify security-related APIs. However, this discovery implies the benchmark suites are not covering more than 8K security-related APIs used by real-world apps. Further, the discovery does not affect the results of RQ1 since almost all of the relevant APIs in each of the considered benchmark suites are deemed as related to security.
VI. THREATS TO VALIDITY
According to Ranganath and Mitra [7] , API usage ignores the influence of richer but hard to measure aspects such as API usage context, security considerations of data, and data/control flow path connecting the various uses of API. However, such aspects might have an influence on measuring representativeness and should be verified.
While we ignored irrelevant APIs (e.g., android/print) by filtering them based on their package prefixes, we may have considered irrelevant APIs (e.g., third-party APIs) that did not adhere to package naming conventions. Such extraneous APIs could have affected the representativeness results.
We used an occurrence of an API in a post to indicate discussion of an API. However, an occurrence of an API does not always imply discussion. Consequently, the reported number of posts discussing an API might be inaccurate.
We used tags associated with posts to identify Android security-related posts. This identification can be inaccurate due to incorrect tagging of posts.
VII. RELATED WORK
Our evaluation builds on the evaluation performed by Ranganath and Mitra [7] . While they measured the representativeness of 42 Ghera benchmarks, we measured the representativeness of DroidBench, ICCBench, and UBCBench along with 60 Ghera benchmarks. While they relied on their knowledge of Android APIs to identify security-related APIs, we relied on community knowledge as captured in Stack Overflow posts for this task. Additionally, we explore gaps in the existing benchmark suites and suggest how to improve/extend them.
VIII. EVALUATION ARTIFACTS
The data from the conducted experiments and the corresponding scripts are available at https://bitbucket. org/account/user/secure-it-i/projects/BENCHPRESS under six repositories -evaluate-repr-droidbench-jan2019 for DroidBench, evaluate-repr-ghera-Jan2019 for Ghera, evaluate-repriccbench-jan2019 for ICCBench, evaluate-repr-ubcbenchApr2019 for UBCBench, prepare-benchmarks for benchmark preparation related experiments, and StackOverflowMarch2019 for Stack Overflow related experiments.
IX. FUTURE WORK
Given the increasing focus on support for securing Android apps, here are few ways to improve benchmark suites and, consequently, help improve Android security analysis tools. 1) Explore richer aspects of real-world apps (e.g. API usage contexts) to develop richer metrics to measure the representativeness of benchmarks. 2) Explore other metrics for indentifying relevant and security-related APIs, e.g., permission maps. 3) Explore the APIs not covered by considered benchmark suites to develop and extend benchmark suites.
X. SUMMARY
In this paper, we measured the representativeness of four Android app vulnerability benchmark suites in terms of the manifestation of vulnerabilities in real-world apps (via API usage). We found all four benchmark suites to be representative. Further, we found there is an opportunity to extend these suites with new benchmarks to capture vulnerabilities stemming from APIs that are not used in any of these suites but often used in real-world apps.
We also discovered that the tags associated with Stack Overflow posts are not the best markers for identifying securityrelated APIs in Android apps.
